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Abstract:	Sex	is	an	important	part	of	human	life.	It	is	a	source	of	pleasure	and	intimacy,	and	is	integral	to	many	people’s	self-identity.	This	chapter	examines	the	opportunities	and	challenges	posed	by	the	use	of	AI	in	how	humans	express	and	enact	their	sexualities.	It	does	so	by	focusing	on	three	main	issues.	First,	it	considers	the	idea	of	digisexuality,	which	according	to	McArthur	and	Twist	(2017)	is	the	label	that	should	be	applied	to	those	‘whose	primary	sexual	identity	comes	through	the	use	of	technology’,	particularly	through	the	use	of	robotics	and	AI.	While	agreeing	that	this	phenomenon	is	worthy	of	greater	scrutiny,	the	chapter	questions	whether	it	is	necessary	or	socially	desirable	to	see	this	as	a	new	form	of	sexual	identity.	Second,	it	looks	at	the	role	that	AI	can	play	in	facilitating	human-to-human	sexual	contact,	focusing	in	particular	on	the	use	of	self-tracking	and	predictive	analytics	in	optimising	sexual	and	intimate	behaviour.	There	are	already	a	number	of	apps	and	services	that	promise	to	use	AI	to	do	this,	but	they	pose	a	range	of	ethical	risks	that	need	to	be	addressed	at	both	an	individual	and	societal	level.	Finally,	it	considers	the	idea	that	a	sophisticated	form	of	AI	could	be	an	object	of	love.	Can	we	be	truly	intimate	with	something	that	has	been	‘programmed’	to	love	us?	Contrary	to	the	widely-held	view,	this	chapter	argues	that	this	is	indeed	possible.			
Introduction		In	early	2017,	the	world	bore	witness	to	its	first	human-robot	marriage.	Zheng	Jiajia,	a	Chinese	engineer	and	AI	expert,	hadn’t	always	intended	to	marry	a	robot.	He	had	spent	years	searching	for	a	(female)	human	partner	and	grew	frustrated	at	his	lack	of	success.1	So	he	decided	to	put	his	engineering	skills	to	the	test	and																																																									1	A	not	uncommon	problem	in	China	given	its	skewed	gender	ratios.	See	World	Economic	Forum,	Global	Gender	Gap	Report	2018,	p	63,	available	at	http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf;	and	also	Viola	Zhou	‘China	has	world’s	most	skewed	sex	ratio	at	birth	–	again’,	South	China	Morning	
Post,	27th	October	2016,	available	at	https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2040544/chinas-
create	his	own	robotic	partner.	He	married	‘her’	in	a	simple,	traditional	ceremony	that	was	witnessed	by	his	mother	and	friends.2	Jiajia’s	robot	wasn’t	particularly	impressive.	According	to	the	reports,	‘she’	was	a	human-sized	doll	with	a	limited	ability	to	recognize	Chinese	characters	and	speak	some	basic	phrases.	But	Jiajia	planned	to	upgrade	‘her’	in	the	near	future.			 Not	long	after	Jiajia’s	nuptials,	Aikikho	Kondo,	a	35	year-old	Japanese	man	living	in	Tokyo,	married	Hatsune	Miku,	a	holographic	virtual	reality	singer	who	floats	inside	a	desktop	device.3	Kondo	too	felt	unlucky	in	(human)	love	and	plumped	for	an	artificial	partner.	In	doing	so,	Kondo	wanted	to	be	recognised	as	a	member	of	a	sexual	minority	of	people	who	are	not	interested	in	human	lovers.			 Neither	Jiajia	nor	Kondo	is	alone.	There	is	an	active	online	community	of	‘iDollators’	who	favour	intimacy	with	artificial	dolls	over	humans.	And	there	are	now	several	companies	eagerly	racing	to	create	more	sophisticated	robotic	and	artificial	companions,	capable	of	providing	their	users	with	both	sexual	intimacy	and	emotional	support.	We	should	not	be	surprised	by	this	trend.	Sex	and	intimacy	are	important	parts	of	human	life	and	they	have	always	been	mediated	and	assisted	by	technology.	Sex	toys	and	sex	dolls	can	be	found	going	back																																																																																																																																																															demographic-time-bomb-still-ticking-worlds-most		
2	Kristin	Huang,	‘Chinese	engineer	‘marries’	robot	after	failing	to	find	a	human	wife’,	South	China	Morning	Post,	4th	April	2017,	available	at	https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2084389/chinese-https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2084389/chinese-engineer-marries-robot-after-failing-find-human-wife		3	AFP-JIJI,	‘Love	in	another	dimension:	Japanese	man	'marries'	Hatsune	Miku	hologram’,	The	Japan	Times,	12	November	2018,	available	at		https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/11/12/national/japanese-man-marries-virtual-reality-singer-hatsune-miku-hologram/#.XFm9vs_7TOQ		
thousands	of	years	back	in	the	archaeological	record.	The	fact	that	the	latest	wave	of	technologies	is	being	leveraged	toward	sexual	ends	is	part	of	this	long-standing	trend.4			 This	chapter	examines	the	ethical	opportunities	and	challenges	posed	by	the	use	of	AI	in	how	humans	express	and	enact	their	sexualities.	It	does	so	by	focusing	on	three	main	issues.	First,	it	considers	the	question	of	sexual	identity	and	asks	if	we	should	apply	a	new	sexual	identity	label	–	‘digisexuality’	–	to	those	who	express	or	direct	their	sexualities	towards	digital/artificial	partners.5	While	agreeing	that	this	phenomenon	is	worthy	of	greater	scrutiny,	the	chapter	argues	that	we	should	be	very	cautious	about	recognising	this	as	a	new	form	of	sexual	identity	as	doing	so	can	have	stigmatising	and	divisive	effects.		Second,	it	looks	at	the	role	that	AI	can	play	in	facilitating	and	assisting	human-to-human	sexual	intimacy,	focusing	in	particular	on	the	use	of	self-tracking	and	predictive	analytics	in	optimising	intimate	behaviour.	It	asks	whether	there	is	something	ethically	objectionable	about	the	use	of	such	AI	assistance.	It	argues	that	there	isn’t,	though	there	are	ethical	risks	that	need	to	be	addressed.	Finally,	it	considers	the	idea	that	a	sophisticated	form	of	AI	could	be	an	object	of	love,	despite	it	having	been	‘programmed’	to	love	us.	Contrary	to	the	widely-held	view,	this	chapter	argues	that	this	is	indeed	possible.																																																										4	Kate	Devlin,	Turned	On:	Science,	Sex	and	Robots,	(London:	Bloomsbury	Sigma,	2018);	and	Hallie	Lieberman,	Buzz:	The	Stimulating	History	of	the	Sex	Toy	(New	York:	Pegasus	Books,	2017)	5	Neil	McArthur	and	Markie	Twist,	‘The	rise	of	digisexuality:	therapeutic	challenges	and	possibilities’	(2017)	Sex	and	Relationship	Therapy	32(3-4):	334-344		
AI	and	Sexual	Identity	Identity	is	central	to	human	existence.	We	all	seek	to	define	and	understand	ourselves	and	others	in	terms	of	different	identity	labels.6	Sexual	identity	labels	are	an	important	part	of	this	pattern	of	classification.	Homosexuality,	bisexuality	and	hetereosexuality	are	all	now	recognised	and,	for	the	most	part,	tolerated	as	distinct	forms	of	sexual	identity	(though	it	was	not	always	thus).			 The	general	tendency	to	classify	ourselves	and	others	in	this	manner	creates	a	temptation	when	it	comes	to	how	we	understand	those,	like	Zheng	Jiajia	and	Aikikho	Kondo,	who	express	and	enact	a	sexual	preference	for	artificial	partners.	In	their	article	‘The	rise	of	the	digisexual’,	Neil	McArthur	and	Markie	Twist	succumb	to	this	temptation.7	They	argue	that	technology	plays	an	important	role	in	how	people	enact	their	sexual	desires	and	that	when	it	comes	to	those	who	display	a	marked	preference	for	artificial	partners,	we	should	recognise	that	they	exhibit	a	new	type	of	sexual	identity,	namely	‘digisexuality’.	As	they	put	it:	“Many	people	will	find	that	their	experiences	with	this	technology	become	integral	to	their	sexual	identity,	and	some	will	come	to	prefer	them	to	direct	sexual	interactions	with	humans.	We	propose	to	label	those	people	who	consider	such	experiences	essential	to	their	sexual	identity,	“digisexuals””.8			 McArthur	and	Twist	make	this	argument	with	circumspection	and	care.	They	point	out	that	sexual	orientations	and	identities	occur	along	a	continuum.																																																									6	Kwame	Anthony	Appiah,	The	Lies	that	Bind:	Rethinking	Identity	(London:	Profile	Books,	2018);	and	Francis	Fukuyama	Identity:	The	Demand	for	Dignity	
and	the	Politics	of	Resentment	(New	York:	Farrar,	Straus	and	Giroux,	2018).	7	McArthur	and	Twist,	n	5	8	McArthur	and	Twist,	n	5,	pp	334-335	
Some	people	will	occasionally	use	technology	to	get	their	kicks	but	will	retain	strong	preferences	for	human-to-human	contact.	They	suggest	that	only	those	who	live	primarily	at	one	extreme	end	of	the	spectrum	deserve	the	label	‘digisexual’.9	They	also	recognise	that	people	belonging	to	this	group	will	almost	certainly	suffer	from	stigmatisation	as	a	result	of	their	pronounced	sexual	preference,	but	then	counter	that	this	simply	needs	to	be	understood	and	combatted.10	In	saying	this,	they	make	the	case	for	using	the	‘digisexuality’	label	from	a	largely	detached,	scientific	perspective,	suggesting	that	this	is	something	that	needs	to	be	acknowledged	and	studied,	not	scorned	and	maligned.		I	agree	that	there	is	a	phenomenon	here	worthy	of	greater	scientific	scrutiny,	but	I	think	we	should	be	very	cautious	about	encouraging	the	widespread	use	of	a	new	sexual	identity	label,	such	as	‘digisexuality’,	even	for	such	scientific	purposes.	Admittedly	this	is	not	something	that	is	necessarily	under	our	control	since,	as	pointed	out	above,	we	are	constantly	in	the	business	of	labeling	and	classifying	one	another.	Nevertheless,	to	the	extent	that	we	can	control	our	tendency	to	label	and	classify	one	another,	we	should	avoid	the	temptation	to	recognise	a	new	minority	of	digisexuals.	This	stance	is	not	motivated	by	any	bigotry	or	desire	to	suppress	a	new	truth	about	human	sexuality.	It	is	motivated	by	the	desire	to	avoid	pathologising	and	‘othering’	what	should	be	viewed	as	part	of	the	ordinary	range	of	human	sexual	desire.		
																																																								9	McArthur	and	Twist,	n	5,	p	338	10	McArthur	and	Twist,	n	5,	p	338	
The	argument	for	this	view	has	two	prongs	to	it.	The	first	is	to	claim	that	the	recognition	of	a	particular	set	of	sexual	desires	as	a	distinctive	identity	or	orientation	is	not	metaphysically	mandated.	In	other	words,	there	is	nothing	in	the	raw	data	of	human	sexual	desire	that	demands	that	we	apply	a	particular	label	or	classification	to	those	desires.	The	second	prong	is	to	argue	that	to	the	extent	that	we	do	apply	such	labels,	there	is	a	tendency	for	us	to	ignore	important	nuances	in	the	actual	raw	data	of	human	sexual	desire	and	for	this	to	have	pernicious	consequences.	Consequently,	since	grouping	some	set	of	sexual	desires	into	a	distinctive	identity	is	not	metaphysically	mandated,	nor	is	it	socially	or	ethically	desirable,	we	should	resist	the	temptation	to	do	so.		Let’s	explore	both	prongs	of	the	argument	in	more	detail,	starting	with	the	claim	that	recognising	a	new	sexual	identity	is	not	metaphysically	warranted.	In	making	this	claim	I	am	inspired	by	a	theory	of	sexual	orientation	developed	by	Saray	Ayala:	the	conceptual	act	theory	of	sexual	orientation.11	The	gist	of	the	theory	is	as	follows.	Humans	have	many	different	phenomenological	experiences	in	their	lifetimes.	In	many	cases,	these	experiences	are	messy	and	not	finely	differentiated.	Think	of	our	auditory	or	colour	experiences.	Though	we	do	perceive	distinctions	between	different	shades	and	different	musical	notes,	the	reality	of	sound	waves	and	light	waves	is	that	they	blend	or	fade	into	one	another.	It	is	only	through	the	use	of	conventional	linguistic	labels	that	we	bring	some	order	and	structure	to	the	phenomenological	soup	of	experience.	What’s	more,	some	people’s	conceptual	toolkit	enables	them	to	more	finely	differentiate	
																																																								11	Saray	Ayala,	‘Sexual	Orientation	and	Choice’	(2018)	Journal	of	Social	Ontology,	3(2):	249-265.	
their	phenomenological	experiences	than	others.	I	know	people	who	can	easily	recognise	and	distinguish	different	notes	and	scales	in	a	piece	of	music.	I	do	not	have	this	ability.	I	lump	together	experiences	that	others	can	split.			The	psychologist	Lisa	Feldman	Barrett	has	argued	that	this	same	phenomenon	underlies	our	emotional	experiences.12	The	initial	phenomenological	reality	of	emotion	is	a	raw	feeling	that	gets	interpreted	through	a	particular	conventional	conceptual	toolkit.	We	translate	our	raw	experience	into	the	feeling	of	‘anger’,	‘sorrow’	or	‘joy’	(and	so	on).	Different	cultures	parse	the	phenomenological	reality	of	emotion	in	different	ways,	grouping	and	organising	feelings	in	ways	that	are	not	immediately	recognisable	to	cultural	outsiders.		Ayala	argues	that	the	same	is	true	for	how	we	experience	sexual	desire.	Over	the	course	of	a	lifetime,	people	will	experience	sexual	desire,	arousal	and	release	in	response	to	many	different	things.	Oftentimes	the	desires	will	be	directed	at	other	people,	but	sometimes	they	won’t.	People	have	been	known	to	experience	arousal	in	response	to	all	sorts	of	environmental	stimuli.	What	then	happens	is	that	people	group	their	sexual	experiences	together	in	order	to	make	sense	of	their	sexual	identities	and	orientations.	In	doing	this,	some	experiences	are	ignored,	suppressed	and	discounted,	while	others	are	accentuated.	You	will	probably	discount	all	those	times	you	got	aroused	by	the	vibrations	of	the	schoolbus,	but	not	those	times	you	got	aroused	when	you	danced	with	your																																																									12	Lisa	Feldman	Barrett,	‘Solving	the	Emotion	Paradox:	Categorization	and	the	Experience	of	Emotion’	(2006)	Personality	and	Social	Psychology	Review	10(1):	20-46	
classmate	at	the	school	dance.	You	won’t	call	yourself	an	automotive-fetishist	no	matter	how	many	times	you	got	aroused	on	the	schoolbus.	Likewise,	and	perhaps	more	realistically,	I	suspect	there	are	many	people	who	primarily	gain	sexual	release	through	masturbation	and	not	through	intercourse	with	another	human	being.	Nevertheless,	I	suspect	that	the	majority	of	those	people	do	not	classify	themselves	as	avowed	autoeroticists.	They	don’t	interpret	their	masturbatory	experiences	through	an	identity-label.	They	see	those	experiences	as	an	important	part	of	the	full	range	of	desirable	sexual	experiences,	all	of	which	are	still	being	actively	pursued.		The	point	here	is	that	the	same	is	likely	to	be	true	of	those	who	get	their	sexual	kicks	through	technology,	even	those	who	primarily	do	so	with	artificial	partners.	Consider	Zhou	Jiajia	and	Aikhikho	Kondo,	for	example.	Both	of	them	claim	to	have	sought	out	artificial	partners	after	failing	to	find	love	among	their	fellow	humans.	This	would	suggest	that	they	haven’t	completely	lost	this	form	of	sexual	desire.		The	danger	is	that	if	we	apply,	and	encourage	them	to	apply,	an	identity-label	to	their	newfound	sexual	preferences,	we	also	encourage	them	to	discount	or	suppress	the	other	aspects	of	their	sexual	affect.	They	start	exaggerating	part	of	a	more	diverse	and	differentiated	phenomenological	reality.		This	brings	us	to	the	second	prong	of	the	argument:	that	applying	identity	labels	can	be	socially	and	ethically	pernicious.	You	might	be	primed	to	be	sceptical	about	this.	You	might	point	to	other	identity	political	movements	in	support	of	your	scepticism	and	argue	that	owning	an	identity	label	can	be	both	politically	and	personally	empowering.	If	you	belong	to	a	group	you	feel	less	
alone	in	the	world.	Similarly,	if	you	and	other	members	of	your	group	are	socially	disadvantaged,	banding	together	can	help	you	to	stand	up	and	agitate	for	legal	rights	and	protections.	This	has	been	true	for	the	feminist	movement	and	the	gay	rights	movement.	But	it	is	noteworthy	that	both	of	these	movements	arose	in	response	to	pre-existing	prejudice	and	discriminatory	classification.	People	within	those	groups	were	already	subject	to	an	oppressive	identity-labeling	and	hence	saw	the	need	to	band	together,	wear	their	label	as	a	matter	of	pride,	and	work	for	social	reform.	In	the	absence	of	that	pre-existing	prejudice,	the	case	for	identity-labeling	is	much	less	persuasive.	Identity-labeling	tends	to	encourage	divisiveness	and	othering	–	the	‘us’	against	‘them’	mentality.	People	quickly	appoint	themselves	as	the	guardians	of	the	identity,	creating	criteria	for	determining	who	belongs	and	who	does	not.	Furthermore,	if	belonging	to	a	particular	identity	category	brings	with	it	certain	social	benefits	and	legal	protections,	people	might	be	encouraged	to	over-interpret	their	experiences	so	that	they	can	fit	within	the	relevant	group:	they	force	themselves	into	a	group	so	that	they	can	belong,	thereby	doing	violence	to	their	actual	experience.	In	short,	the	identity-labeling	can	foster,	just	as	often	as	it	can	combat,	social	division	and	polarisation.			To	be	clear,	the	claim	is	not	that	all	identity-labels	are	pernicious	or	scientifically	inaccurate.	Some	labels	have	social	and	scientific	value.	The	claim	is	rather	that	identity-labels	have	power	and	should	be	treated	with	caution.	Sexual	phenomenology	is	often	more	diverse	and	differentiated	than	our	identity	labels	allow.	This	means	that	lumping	someone	into	a	particular	category	is	often	not	warranted.	Recognising	and	valorising	the	identity	label	may	encourage	and	
incentivise	people	to	force	themselves	to	fit	into	a	category	to	which	they	do	not	belong.	So,	unless	we	are	trying	to	combat	some	pre-existing	social	prejudice	or	stigmatisation,	we	should	very	reluctant	to	classify	people	as	‘digisexuals’.	This	does	not	mean	that	we	must	ignore	the	role	that	artificial	partners	play	in	people’s	sexual	lives,	or	that	we	cannot	study	the	various	manifestations	of	‘digisexualities’.	It	just	means	we	should	avoid	labeling	people	as	‘digisexuals’	(or	any	other	cognate	term	like	‘robosexual’).	We	should	accept	this	as	just	part	of	the	normal	range	of	human	sexual	experience.		
AI	and	Sexual	Assistance	Sex	toys	and	other	sex	aids	have	long	been	used	to	assist	and	complement	human-to-human	sexual	activity,	and	AIs	and	robots	are	already	widely	used	to	assist	and	complement	non-sexual	human	activity.	It	should	be	no	surprise	then	to	find	AI	being	harnessed	toward	sexually	assistive	ends.	We	already	see	smart	sex	toys	that	try	to	learn	from	user	data	to	optimise	sexual	pleasure;	‘quantified	self’	apps	that	enable	users	to	track	and	optimise	aspects	of	their	sexual	performance;	and	simple	AI	assistants	that	help	with	intimate	behaviour,	including	apps	that	help	to	automate	or	assist	with	sending	intimate	communications	to	your	partner.13	Does	the	use	of	such	AI-based	sexual	
																																																								13	For	discussions	of	the	different	apps	and	services,	see:	Deborah	Lupton,	‘Quantified	sex:	A	critical	analysis	of	sexual	and	reproductive	self-tracking	using	apps’,	(2015)	Culture,	Health	and	Sexuality	17	(4):440–53;	Karen	Levy,	‘Intimate	surveillance’	(2014)	Idaho	Law	Review	51:679–93;	John	Danaher,	Sven	Nyholm	and	Brian	Earp	‘The	Quantified	Relationship’	(2018)	American	Journal	of	
Bioethics	18(2):	1-19;	John	Danaher,	‘Toward	an	Ethics	of	AI	Assistants:	An	Initial	Framework’	(2018)	Philosophy	and	Technology	31(4):	629-653;	and	Evan	Selinger	‘Today’s	Apps	are	Turning	us	Into	Sociopaths’	WIRED	26	February	2014	-	available	at	https://www.wired.com/2014/02/outsourcing-humanity-apps/;	and	Evan	Selinger,	‘Don’t	outsource	your	dating	Life’	CNN:	Edition	2	May	2014	-	
assistants	raise	any	significant	ethical	concerns?	In	previous	work,	I,	along	with	my	colleagues	Sven	Nyholm	and	Brian	Earp,	analysed	eight	different	ethical	concerns	one	might	have	about	the	use	of	AI	in	intimate	relationships.14	In	the	interests	of	brevity,	I	will	discuss	four	key	ethical	concerns	here:		
The	Privacy	Concern:	This	is	the	big	one.	This	is	the	concern	that	the	use	of	AI	assistants	in	intimate	sexual	relationships	constitutes	a	major	assault	on	personal	privacy.	This	could	be	because	partners	use	services	to	spy	on	one	another	without	consent.	This	is	already	a	problem	in	abusive	intimate	relationships.15	It	could	also	be	because	AI	assistants	are	owned	and	controlled	by	third	parties	(e.g.	companies/corporations)	who	capture	sexual	data	from	their	users	and	use	this	to	optimise	and	market	their	products	and	services.	Sometimes	this	is	done	with	the	consent	of	the	users;	sometimes	it	is	not.	Indeed,	several	lawsuits	have	already	been	settled	between	companies	and	users	of	smart	sex	toys	due	to	the	fact	that	data	was	collected	from	those	devices	without	the	users’	consent.16	Of	course,	violations	of	privacy	are	a	general	concern	with	digital	technology,	extending	far	beyond	the	sexual	or	intimate	use	case,17	but	one	might	argue	that	the	ethical	concerns	are	higher	in	this	case	given	the	unique	importance	of	sexual	privacy.																																																																																																																																																															available	at	http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/01/opinion/selinger-outsourcing-activities/index.html	(accessed	29/11/2016).	14	Danaher,	Nyholm	and	Earp,	n	13	15	Levy,	n	13	16	Alex	Hern,	‘Vibrator	maker	ordered	to	pay	out	C$4m	for	tracking	users'	sexual	activity’,	The	Guardian	14	March	2017,	available	at	https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/14/we-vibe-vibrator-tracking-users-sexual-habits		17	Woodrow	Hartzog,	Privacy’s	Blueprint:	The	Battle	to	Control	the	Design	of	New	
Technologies	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2018);	and	Shoshana	Zuboff,	The	Age	of	Surveillance	Capitalism	(London:	Profile	Books	2019)	
	
The	Disengagement	Concern:	This	is	the	concern	that	AI	sexual	assistants	may	distract	us	from,	or	encourage	us	to	disengage	from,	sexually	intimate	activity	and	thereby	corrode	or	undermine	a	core	part	of	the	value	of	that	activity.	The	argument	would	be	that	a	lot	of	the	good	of	sexual	intimacy	(and	other	forms	of	intimacy)	stems	from	being	present	in	the	moment,	i.e.	enjoying	the	sexual	activity	for	what	it	is.	But	can	you	really	be	present	if	you	are	using	some	sex-assistant	to	track	the	number	of	calories	you	burn,	or	the	decibel	level	reached,	or	the	number	of	thrusts	that	take	place	during	sexual	activity?	(These,	incidentally,	are	all	real	examples	of	some	of	the	uses	to	which	descriptive	and	predictive	analytics	have	been	put	in	intimate	apps.)18	Similarly,	but	in	a	non-sexual	case,	Evan	Selinger	worries	about	the	use	of	automated	and	AI-assisted	intimate	communication	apps	on	the	grounds	that	they	create	the	impression	that	someone	is	thinking	about	and	caring	about	another	person	in	a	particular	moment	when	in	fact	they	are	not	and	are	letting	the	app	do	the	work	for	them.19	The	disengagement	concern	is,	once	again,	a	general	concern	about	digital	technology	–	think	of	all	those	complaints	about	the	“anti-social”	use	of	smartphones	at	parties	and	meetings	–	but	we	might	worry	that	it	is	particularly	problematic	in	the	intimate	case	because	of	how	important	being	present	is	to	intimacy.		
The	Misdirection	Concern:	Related	to	the	previous	concern,	this	is	a	concern	about	the	kinds	of	things	that	AI	sexual	assistants	might	assist	people	
																																																								18	Danaher,	Nyholm	and	Earp,	n	13.	19	Selinger	n	13	
with.	AI	assistants	in	general	tend	to	provide	users	with	information	or	prompt	them	to	do	certain	things.	The	same	is	likely	to	occur	with	AI	sexual	assistants:	they	might	give	users	information	about	how	to	optimise	their	sexual	experiences	or	prompt	them	to	try	particular	activities.	One	worry	is	that	the	assistants	could	encourage	activities	that	are	not	conducive	to	good	sexual	experience.	This	is,	indeed,	already	an	expressed	concern	about	the	various	sex	tracking	apps	that	have	been	created.20	As	noted,	those	apps	often	encourage	users	to	focus	on	things	like	the	number	of	calories	burned	during	sex,	the	number	of	thrusts	during	sex,	and	the	decibel	level	reached	during	sex.	One	reason	for	this	is	that	it	is	relatively	easy	to	track	and	measure	these	things.	But	there	is	no	reason	to	think	that	any	of	them	is	correlated	with	good	sex.	On	the	contrary,	focusing	on	those	measures	might	actually	undermine	good	sex.	This	worry	is	distinct	from	the	previous	one	because	it	is	not	about	the	user	being	taken	out	of	the	moment	but	rather	about	them	doing	things	that	are	not	particularly	pleasurable/valuable	in	the	moment.		
The	Ideological	Concern:	A	final	concern,	which	is	also	related	to	the	two	preceding	ones,	has	to	do	with	the	ideological	impact	of	AI	sexual	assistants	on	intimate	relationships.	The	concern	is	that	these	assistants	might	impose	a	certain	model	of	what	an	ideal	intimate/sexual	relationship	is	on	the	people	who	make	use	of	them.	They	might,	for	example,	recreate	and	reinforce	gender	stereotypes	about	sexual	desire	and	preference.	Karen	Levy,	for	example,	has	argued	that	many	intimate	tracking	apps	reinforce	the	view	that	women	are	the	
																																																								20	On	this	criticism	see	Lupton,	n	13	and	Levy	n	13	
subjects	of	surveillance	and	sexual	control.21	Others	argue	that	the	apps	might	encourage	an	economic	or	exchange-based	model	of	intimate	relations	over	a	more	informal-reciprocation	model.	This	is	because	the	devices	might	encourage	users	to	track	who	does	what	for	whom	and	encourage	them	to	optimise/maximise	certain	metrics,	all	to	the	detriment	of	what	a	truly	valuable	intimate	relationship	should	be.22		What	can	be	said	in	response	to	these	concerns?	Well,	the	privacy	concern	is	probably	the	most	serious.	If	partners	use	AI	assistants	to	spy	on	one	another	or	manipulate	one	another’s	behaviour	in	a	non-transparent	way,	then	this	would	be	a	major	worry.	It	could	provide	assistance	and	cover	for	dominating	and	abusive	relationships.	Such	relationships	will	exist	in	the	absence	of	technological	assistance,	but	the	technology	might	make	it	easier	to	implement	certain	forms	of	dominating	control.	It	seems	uncontroversial	then	to	suggest	that	any	app	or	service	that	makes	it	easy	for	one	intimate	partner	to	spy	on	another	without	the	other’s	consent	should,	if	possible,	be	banned.	Spying	by	third	parties	should	also	be	limited	but	is	trickier	to	manage.	It	does	seem	to	be	inherent	to	digital	technology	that	it	facilitates	some	kind	of	tracking	and	surveillance.	We	can	try	to	mitigate	the	harm	that	is	done	by	this	tracking	and	surveillance	through	robust	legal	protection	of	individual	privacy.	This	legal	protection	would	force	the	companies	that	provide	the	relevant	apps	and	services	to	put	in	place	measures	that	prevent	non-transparent	and	non-
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consensual	uses	of	individual	data.	The	EU’s	General	Data	Protection	Regulation	is	a	step	in	the	right	direction	in	this	regard.			But	it	may	well	be	that	people	are	willing	to	waive	their	privacy	rights	in	order	to	make	use	of	assistive	technologies.	This	appears	to	be	the	case	for	many	people	already.	How	many	times	have	you	consented	to	digital	surveillance	out	of	convenience?	Privacy	advocates	can	counter	that	this	is	simply	because	people	do	not	fully	appreciate	the	damage	that	can	be	done	by	the	misuse	of	their	personal	data,	but	even	still,	for	many	people,	convenient	access	to	digital	services	is	often	favoured	over	privacy.	This	suggests	that	whether	or	not	people	are	willing	to	forego	some	privacy	when	using	AI	sex	assistants	might	depend	on	whether	they	find	those	assistants	useful	in	their	intimate	lives.	If	they	do,	then	sexual	privacy	might	be	significantly	eroded.			This	is	where	the	other	three	objections	come	in.	They	provide	some	reason	to	question	whether	AI	sex	assistants	will	in	fact	be	useful,	highlighting	the	various	ways	in	which	they	might	undermine	or	corrode	intimate	relationships.		Although	each	of	the	three	concerns	has	some	merit,	they	can	be	overstated.	There	are	three	reasons	for	this.	First,	it	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	there	is	no	single	model	for	the	ideal	intimate	relationship.	Different	relationship	models	work	for	different	sets	of	people	at	different	times.	Apps	and	assistive	AI	that	seem	useless,	distracting	or	misdirected	to	some	people,	might	be	useful,	engaging	and	fulfilling	to	others.	Even	the	seemingly	comical	examples	of	sex	tracking	apps	that	get	people	to	quantify	certain	aspects	of	their	sex	life	might,	for	some	people,	lead	to	a	more	pleasurable	and	fulfilling	sex	life.	As	long	
as	people	are	not	forced	or	compelled	to	use	particular	AI	sex	assistants,	their	use	need	not	lead	to	the	ideological	imposition	of	a	specific	model	of	the	ideal	relationship.	A	diversity	of	apps	and	assistants	could	provide	room	for	partners	to	explore	different	possibilities	in	accordance	with	their	own	needs	and	wishes.	Second,	while	some	of	the	early	attempts	to	provide	AI	assistance	might	seem	crude	and	unsophisticated,	they	are	likely	to	improve	over	time	and	provide	more	useful	guidance.	This	is	because	there	is	reason	to	think	that	the	tracking	and	quantification	made	possible	by	sex	and	relationship	apps	can	be	used	to	good	effect.	To	give	one	example	of	this,	the	research	carried	out	by	the	Gottman	Institute	on	successful	relationships	suggests	that	relationships	can	be	improved	if	partners	explicitly	record	details	of	their	intimate	lives,	and	follow	certain	rituals	of	connection.23	These	recommendations	are	based	on	extensive,	longitudinal	research	on	what	makes	for	a	successful	intimate	relationship.	Digital	assistants	could	make	it	easier	to	implement	these	recommendations.	Indeed,	the	Gottman	Institute	already	offers	a	free	smartphone	app	that	helps	couples	implement	some	of	them.24	One	can	easily	imagine	more	sophisticated,	AI-based	versions	of	this	app	coming	onstream	in	the	future	and	providing	far	more	effective	and	personalised	assistance.	Third,	to	the	extent	that	worries	remain	about	the	effect	of	these	technologies	on	sexual	intimacy,	these	worries	can	be	mitigated	(to	a	large	extent)	by	encouraging	more	thoughtful	engagement	with	the	technology.	The	problems	outlined	above	are	at	their	most	severe	if	people	use	AI	assistants	as	a	substitute	for	thinking	for	themselves	and	not	as	a	complement	to	thinking	for	themselves.	If	there	could	be	one	major	
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recommendation	made	to	the	designers	of	AI	intimate	assistants	it	would	be	to	include	clear	warnings	to	users	that	the	services	and	recommendations	offered	by	these	assistants	are	not	a	panacea	to	all	their	sexual	woes.	They	can	be	beneficial,	but	only	if	the	user(s)	critically	reflects	on	the	role	of	the	service	in	their	own	intimate	lives.	Including	prompts	for	such	critical	reflection	could	be	a	focus	for	designers	who	wish	to	encourage	the	ethical	use	of	AI	sex	assistants.		The	bottom	line	is,	then,	that	although	AI	assistants	could	undermine	and	corrode	our	intimate	and	sexual	lives,	there	is	some	reason	for	optimism.	The	careful,	critical	and	non-dogmatic	use	of	such	assistants	might	complement	and	improve	our	intimate	behaviour.		
AI	and	Love	Let’s	close	out	this	chapter	by	returning	to	the	two	men	whose	stories	I	told	in	the	introduction:	Zheng	Jiajia	and	Aikikho	Kondo.	Both	of	them	‘married’	artificial	beings.	An	obvious	question	to	ask	is	what	the	ethical	or	philosophical	status	of	those	marriages	might	be?	Are	they	manifestations	of	genuinely	loving	relationships	or	are	they	slightly	unusual	sexual	fetishes?	At	the	outset,	I	would	emphasise	that	any	answer	to	this	question	should	not	be	taken	to	stigmatise	or	shame	those	who	prefer	such	relationships.	But	the	question	is	worth	asking	since	we	attach	a	lot	of	value	to	loving	relationships	and	if	we	could	have	loving	relationships	with	AIs	and	robots,	it	might	provide	reason	to	create	them.		There	is,	however,	no	shortage	of	opposition	to	the	idea	that	one	could	be	in	a	loving	relationship	with	a	robot.	Dylan	Evans,	for	example,	has	argued	that	
there	is	something	paradoxical	about	the	idea	of	robotic	lover.25	His	argument	focuses	on	the	asymmetrical	nature	of	the	relationship	between	a	human	and	a	robot.	Presumably,	any	robotic	lover	will	be	programmed	to	‘love’	their	human	partner.	If	the	robot	could	choose	their	partner	then	what	would	be	the	point	in	creating	it?	The	advantage	of	having	a	robot	lover	over	a	human	lover	is	the	fact	that	the	robot	has	to	love	you:	that	you	have	ultimate	control	over	its	responses	to	you	(this	desire	for	control	seems	to	be	one	of	the	motivations	behind	Zheng	Jiajia	and	Aikikho	Kondo’s	actions).	But	this	control	comes	at	a	cost,	according	to	Evans,	because	a	core	part	of	what	people	want	in	a	loving	relationship	is	a	partner	(or	partners)	who	freely	chooses	to	be	with	them.	As	he	puts	it,	people	want	their	lover’s	commitment	to	them	to	“be	the	fruit	of	an	ongoing	choice,	rather	than	inflexible	and	unreflexive	behavior	patterns”.26			Michael	Hauskeller	also	argues	against	the	idea	of	a	robotic	lover.	Although	he	concedes	that	it	may	be	possible	to	create	human-like	robots	that	‘appear’	to	be	in	love	with	you,	he	counters	that	such	a	lover	would	never	be	as	satisfying	to	you	as	a	human	lover.	Following	Evans,	he	argues	that	one	of	the	main	reasons	for	this	is	that	no	matter	how	good	the	illusion	of	love	is,	there	would	always	be	some	reason	to	suspect	or	doubt	whether	the	robot	really	loves	you,	given	its	origins.27		
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	In	a	more	extensive	analysis	of	the	concept	of	love,	Sven	Nyholm	and	Lily	Frank	also	express	doubts	about	the	possibility	of	being	in	a	loving	relationship	with	a	robot.28	Exploring	different	conceptions	of	romantic	love	(including,	the	claim	that	to	be	in	love	is	to	be	a	‘good	match’	with	your	partner,	or	to	be	attracted	to	the	‘distinctive	particularity’	of	your	partner)	they	argue	that	while	it	is	not	impossible	to	create	a	robot	that	meets	the	conditions	needed	for	a	loving	relationship,	it	would	be	exceptionally	difficult	to	do	so,	requiring	technology	far	in	advance	of	what	is	currently	available.	In	making	their	case,	they	use	the	‘hired	actor’	analogy	to	express	the	basic	problem	with	creating	a	robotic	lover:	it	seems	like	the	best	we	can	really	do	with	a	robotic	lover	is	to	create	an	entity	that	‘plays	the	part’	of	being	in	love	with	you,	but	never	quite	graduates	from	acting	to	genuine	love.29		These	criticisms	are	intuitive	and	attractive,	but	they	have	some	problems.	To	see	what	they	are	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	two	fears	articulated	by	the	critics.	The	first	–	which	we	might	call	the	‘no	depth’	fear	–	is	that	robot	lovers	are	all	surface	and	no	depth.	They	act	‘as	if’	they	love	you	but	there	is	nothing	more	to	it	than	performance:	they	don’t	really	feel	or	consciously	experience	the	relevant	emotions	that	we	associate	with	being	in	love.	The	second	–	which	we	might	call	the	‘programming’	fear	–	is	that	robot	lovers	cannot	freely	and	autonomously	choose	to	love	you.	They	will	always	be	
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programmed	to	love	you.	These	two	fears	are	related	to	one	another	–	most	alleged	robot	lovers	probably	lack	depth	and	free	choice	–	but	they	are	not	the	same	thing.	A	robot	might	be	programmed	to	love	you	even	if	it	has	the	right	kind	of	experiential	depth	and	vice	versa.			Are	these	two	criticisms	of	robot	lovers	valid?	Let’s	consider	the	‘no	depth’	problem	first.	The	easy	rebuttal	to	this	is	to	say	that	even	if	robots	currently	lack	the	requisite	experiential	depth	it	is	possible,	someday,	that	they	will	have	it.	When	that	day	arrives,	we	can	have	robot	lovers.	The	major	problem	with	this	rebuttal,	however,	is	that	it	kicks	the	can	down	the	road	and	fails	to	grapple	with	the	philosophical	issue	at	the	heart	of	the	‘no	depth’	argument,	namely:	does	experiential	depth	actually	matter	when	it	comes	to	determining	whether	or	not	a	particular	relationship	counts	as	a	loving	one?	I	don’t	think	it	does.	If	a	robot	appears,	on	the	surface,	to	be	in	love	with	you	then	that’s	all	it	takes	for	you	to	be	in	a	loving	relationship	with	that	robot.		This	might	sound	a	little	crazy,	but	I	defend	this	position	on	the	grounds	that	we	must,	as	a	practical	matter,	be	behaviourists	when	it	comes	to	understanding	the	ethical	status	of	our	relationships	with	other	beings.30	In	other	words,	we	have	to	apply	the	methodological	behaviourism	of	psychologists	and	computer	scientists	(e.g.	the	behaviourism	at	the	heart	of	the	Turing	Test	for	machine	intelligence)	to	our	ethical	relationships	with	other	beings.		The	central	tenet	of	this	‘ethical	behaviourism’	is	that	when	you	try	to	determine	the	moral	
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quality	of	your	relationships	(including	your	duties	and	responsibilities)	with	other	beings	you	cannot	use	unobservable,	inner	mental	states	to	make	your	assessment.	You	have	to	rely	on	externally	observable	behavioural	and	functional	patterns.	You	may,	of	course,	hypothesise	the	existence	of	inner	mental	states	to	explain	those	observable	patterns.	But	any	inference	you	make	as	to	the	presence	of	those	states	must	ultimately	be	grounded	in	or	guided	by	an	externally	observable	pattern.	The	problem	with	many	of	the	philosophical	accounts	of	what	it	takes	to	be	in	a	loving	relationship	is	that	they	focus,	implicitly	or	explicitly,	on	unobservable	and	inherently	private	mental	states	(e.g.	feelings	of	commitment/attachment,	sincere	expressions	of	emotions	and	so).	As	a	result,	it	is	effectively	impossible	to	have	any	confidence	in	the	existence	of	loving	relationships	unless	you	accept	that	observable	behavioural	and	functional	patterns	can	provide	epistemic	warrant	for	our	judgments	about	the	presence	of	the	relevant	private	mental	states.	In	other	words,	ethical	behaviourism	is	already,	of	necessity,	the	approach	we	take	to	understanding	the	ethical	status	of	our	relationships	with	our	fellow	human	beings.	This	means	the	‘no	depth’	argument	doesn’t	work.	Since	we	are	unable	to	plumb	the	depths	of	our	human	lovers,	we	cannot	apply	a	different	standard	to	robotic	lovers.			This	point	has	to	be	finessed	in	order	to	avoid	some	potentially	absurd	interpretations.	For	starters,	it	is	important	to	realise	that	in	order	to	provide	the	basis	for	a	loving	relationship,	the	performance	and	‘illusion’	from	a	robot	will	need	to	be	equivalent	to	the	performance	and	illusion	we	get	from	a	human	lover.	It’s	unlikely	that	any	currently	existing	robot	or	AI	achieves	such	
performative	equivalency.	So	this	remains,	to	some	extent,	a	future	possibility,	not	a	present	reality.			Similarly,	there	are	some	counterarguments	to	ethical	behaviourism	that	are	worth	considering,	if	only	to	deepen	the	understanding	of	what	ethical	behaviourism	entails.	For	example,	some	people	might	argue	that	we	do	rely	on	something	other	than	behaviour	to	determine	the	moral	quality	of	our	relationships	with	others.	Perhaps	it	is	because	we	know	that	our	lovers	are	made	of	the	right	stuff	(biological/organic	material)	that	we	are	confident	they	can	love	us?	Or	perhaps	it	is	because	we	know	they	have	the	right	kind	of	developmental/evolutionary	history?	If	so,	then	someone	might	argue	that	robots	and	AI	would	still	not	count	as	‘proper’	lovers	even	if	they	were	performatively	equivalent	to	human	lovers.			But	it	is	hard	to	see	why	the	presence	or	absence	of	these	other	factors	should	have	should	have	that	effect.	What	is	the	rational	connection	between	being	made	of	the	right	stuff	(or	having	the	right	history)	and	the	capacity	to	form	a	loving	relationship	with	another?	Suppose	your	spouse	behaves	in	a	way	that	is	entirely	consistent	with	the	hypothesis	that	they	love	you.	But	then	suppose,	one	day,	you	learn	that	they	are,	in	fact,	an	alien	from	another	planet	and	don’t	share	the	same	biological	constitution.	They	continue	to	behave	as	they	always	did.	Should	you	doubt	whether	you	are	in	a	truly	loving	relationship	with	them?	It’s	hard	to	see	why	.	The	revelation	of	their	alien	origins,	in	and	of	itself,	should	not	undermine	the	claim	that	they	are	in	a	loving	relationship.	The	
consistent	behavioural	evidence	of	love	should	trump	the	other	considerations.	The	same	should	hold	for	a	robotic	or	artificial	lover.		Some	people	might	come	back	and	argue	that	there	are	cases	where	our	faith	in	the	existence	of	a	loving	relationship	would	be	shaken	by	learning	something	about	the	origins	or	history	of	our	human	lovers.	Suppose,	for	example,	you	learn	that	your	human	lover	was,	indeed,	a	hired	actor,	or	that	they	have	been	having	an	affair	for	years	without	your	awareness.	Surely	that	would	undermine	your	confidence	that	they	are	in	a	loving	relationship	with	you?	And	surely	that	is	more	akin	to	what	it	would	be	like	to	have	a	robot	lover?	But	these	counterexamples	do	not	work.	For	starters,	it	is	not	clear	that	either	of	these	revelations	should	shake	our	faith	in	the	existence	of	a	loving	relationship.	It	seems	plausible	to	suggest	that	a	hired	actor	could	grow	to	love	the	person	with	whom	they	have	an	initially	fake	relationship,	and	it	also	seems	plausible	to	suggest	that	love	can	survive	infidelity.	If	the	person	still	behaves	and	appears	to	love	you	then	perhaps	they	do,	despite	these	revelations.	But	even	if	that’s	a	stretch	for	some	people,	I	would	suggest	that	what	really	shakes	their	faith	in	the	existence	of	a	loving	relationship	in	both	of	these	cases	is	the	fact	that	they	will	acquire	(or	have	reason	to	suspect	the	existence	of)	some	new	behavioural	evidence	that	contradicts	the	old	behavioural	evidence	that	convinced	them	they	were	in	a	loving	relationship.	For	example,	they	may	have	learned	(or	start	to	suspect)	that	the	actor	says	bad	things	about	them	when	they	are	‘off’	the	job	or	that	their	partner	has	been	planning	to	leave	them	for	the	person	with	they	are	having	an	affair.	This	new	behavioural	evidence	might	completely	undermine	their	belief	in	a	loving	relationship	or	at	least	prompt	them	to	seek	out	further	
behavioural	evidence	to	confirm	whether	their	partner	still	loves	them.	Either	way,	it	is	behavioural	evidence	that	will	do	the	damage	(or	repair).	In	any	event,	neither	of	these	examples	is	a	good	analogy	with	the	robotic	lover	case,	where	presumably	the	robotic	nature	and	origins	of	the	lover	will	be	known	from	day	one.		 	What	about	the	‘programming’	fear?	Evans	is	right	that	we	want	(or,	at	least,	should	want)	our	lovers	to	freely	choose	us.	If	a	robot	is	programmed	or	conditioned	to	love	us	then	it	seems	like	there	is	something	suspicious	or	inferior	about	the	kind	of	‘love’	they	can	give.	But	we	shouldn’t	overstate	this	fear	either.	It	is	conceivable	that	we	could	create	robotic	lovers	that	behave	‘as	if’	they	freely	choose	us	(and,	remember,	behaving	‘as	if’	they	choose	us	is	enough,	following	ethical	behaviourism).	The	robotic	lover	might	act	in	fickle	way	or	test	its	human	companion’s	true	commitment,	much	like	a	human	lover.	This	could	even	be	an	attractive	quality	in	a	robotic	lover,	because	it	makes	it	more	like	the	human-to-human	case.	The	desire	for	this	isn’t	as	bizarre	or	unfathomable	as	Evans	makes	out.		 	But	beyond	that,	there	is	also	reason	to	doubt	whether	the	presence	or	absence	of	‘programming’	should	undermine	our	belief	in	the	existence	of	a	loving	relationship.	Humans	are	arguably	‘programmed’	to	love	one	another.	A	combination	of	innate	biological	drives	and	cultural	education	makes	humans	primed	to	find	one	another	sexually	attractive	and	form	deep	and	lasting	bonds	with	one	another.	Indeed,	people	often	talk	about	love	as	being	something	other	than	a	free	and	autonomous	choice.	We	‘fall’	into	love;	we	don’t	choose	it.	We	
find	ourselves	attracted	to	others	despite	our	better	judgment.	The	heart	wants	what	it	wants,	and	so	on.	Furthermore,	in	some	cultures,	arranged	marriages	and	relationships	are	common	and	while	they	seem	unusual,	maybe	even	cruel,	from	some	perspectives,	the	partners	in	such	relationships	often	grow	to	love	one	another	and	report	high	levels	of	relationship-satisfaction,	sometimes	higher	and	often	no	worse	than	the	satisfaction	of	those	in	‘autonomous’	marriages.31	So	it	is	not	that	unusual	to	believe	that	love	can	blossom	from	some	pre-programming	and	pre-arranging	of	unions.		Critics	might	dispute	these	examples	and	argue	that	the	kind	of	programming	involved	in	human	relationships	is	very	different	from	the	kind	that	will	arise	in	human-robot	relationships.	Humans	are	only	loosely	programmed	to	seek	attachment.	They	are	not	brainwashed	to	love	a	particular	person.	Also,	even	in	the	case	of	arranged	marriage	(where	there	is	greater	restriction	and	direction	of	choice)	the	partners	are	not	coerced	into	the	relationship	on	an	ongoing	basis.	They	can	exercise	their	autonomy	after	the	union	has	formed	and	escape	the	relationship	if	they	desire.			But	it	is	not	clear	that	the	disanalogies	are	all	that	strong.	It	is	true	that,	classically,	robots	and	AIs	were	programmed	from	the	top-down	by	particular	human	programmers	to	follow	highly	specified	instructions,	but	this	is	no	longer	the	norm.	Robots	and	AIs	are	now	programmed	from	the	bottom	up,	to	follow																																																									31	Robert	Epstein,	Mayuri	Pandit	and	Mansi	Thakar,	‘How	Love	Emerges	in	Arranged	Marriages:	Two	Cross-cultural	Studies’	(2013)	Journal	of	Comparative	
Family	Studies,	44	(3):	341-360;	and	PC	Regan,	S	Lakhanpal,	and	C	Anguiano,	‘Relationship	outcomes	in	Indian-American	love-based	and	arranged	marriages’	(2012)	Psychological	Report	110(3):915-24.	
learning	rules,	and	to	adapt	to	new	challenges	and	circumstances.	The	flexibility	of	this	adaptive	learning	is	still	rather	limited	–	we	are	yet	to	create	a	generalised	form	of	artificial	intelligence	–	but	as	this	approach	proliferates	and	grows	the	alleged	disanalogies	between	the	programming	of	human	lovers	and	robot	lovers	will	narrow.	It	will	no	longer	be	absurd	to	claim	that	robot	lovers	commit	to	us	on	the	basis	of	a	free	and	ongoing	choice,	nor	to	imagine	that	they	might	fall	out	of	love	with	us	through	continued	learning.		None	of	this	to	say	that	preferring	a	robot	lover	over	a	human	lover	is	a	good	thing	or	that	there	are	no	ethical	problems	with	creating	robot	lovers.	There	are.		Worries	about	the	objectification	and	domination	of	robot	partners,	as	well	as	the	social	consequences	that	this	might	have,	have	been	voiced	by	several	critics.	I	have	discussed	these	worries	at	length	in	previous	work.32	Similarly,	Nyholm	and	Frank	argue	that	the	creators	of	robotic	lovers	and	sexual	partners	may	be	under	an	obligation	not	to	mislead	users	as	to	the	capacities	of	the	robots	in	question	to	form	loving	relationships.33	They	worry	that	manufacturers	might	be	tempted	to	exploit	the	emotional	vulnerability	of	some	consumers	in	order	to	make	their	products	more	attractive.	While	this	is	a	problem	with	all	consumer	products	(to	some	extent),	it	seems	like	a	particularly	acute	problem	for	robotic	lovers,	given	the	centrality	and	importance	of	sex	and																																																									32	John	Danaher,	‘Robotic	Rape	and	Robotic	Child	Sexual	Abuse:	Should	they	be	Criminalised?’	(2017)	Criminal	Law	and	Philosophy	11(1):	71-95;	John	Danaher	‘The	Symbolic	Consequences	Argument	in	the	Sex	Robot	Debate’	in	Danaher	and	McArthur	(eds)	Robot	Sex:	Social	and	Ethical	Implications	(Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press,	2017);	and	John	Danaher,	‘Regulating	Child	Sex	Robots:	Restriction	or	Experimentation?’	(2019)	Medical	Law	Review,	forthcoming.	33	Sven	Nyholm	and	Lily	Eva	Frank	‘It	Loves	Me,	It	Loves	Me	Not:	Is	it	Morally	Problematic	to	Design	Sex	Robots	that	Appear	to	“Love”	Their	Owners?”	(2019)	
Techné,	forthcoming	
love	in	human	life.	A	relatively	strict	set	of	rules	may	be	required	to	guard	against	abuse.	But,	of	course,	what	is	and	is	not	permitted	by	this	set	of	rules	depends,	crucially,	on	what	we	think	it	takes	to	form	a	legitimate	loving	relationship.	This	is	why	I	have	focused	on	the	philosophical	nature	of	love	in	the	preceding	discussion.	If	I	am	correct	in	my	analysis,	it	will	someday	possible	to	form	a	loving	relationship	with	a	robot	if	the	robot	can	convincingly	and	consistently	perform	the	part	of	being	a	lover,	and	hence	any	restrictions	imposed	to	prevent	exploitation	will	need	to	take	that	into	consideration.		
Conclusion	To	wrap	up,	AI	and	robotics	are	being,	and	will	continue	to	be,	used	to	augment	and	complement	human	sexuality.	In	this	chapter,	I	have	addressed	three	issues	that	might	arise	as	a	result	and	made	three	main	arguments.	First,	I	have	argued	that	we	should	be	cautious	about	recognising	a	new	form	of	sexual	identity	that	applies	to	those	who	primarily	express	and	enact	their	sexualities	through	these	technologies.	Doing	so	is	not	metaphysically	mandated	and	may	contribute	to	social	stigmatisation.	Second,	I	have	argued	that	AI	can	be	used	to	assist	human	sexual	and	intimate	relationships.	Such	assistance	poses	a	number	of	risks	–	particularly	to	privacy	–	but	these	risks	should	not	be	overstated	and	should	not	prevent	the	beneficial	use	of	AI	sex	assistants.	Finally,	I	argued	that,	contrary	to	a	number	of	critics,	it	is	possible	to	form	a	loving	relationship	with	a	robot	or	AI.	It’s	a	brave	new	world	into	which	we	are	stepping.	Let’s	make	it	a	sexually	enriching	one.		
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